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CORPORATE TAKEOVERS

A Recommendation For A California Policy

An Overview of the Issue

Senate Commission on
Corporate Governance,
Shareholder Rights and
Securities Transactions
March 1988

The members of the Senate Commission on Corporate Governance,
Shareholder Rights and
ies
ac
all have experience in some facet of corporation
t
s law. Many of
the Commission members are regularly involved with corporate
takeovers, advising management, bidders and institutions.
Since October 1987, the Commission has been actively

scussing

and debating the issue of a state policy in response to the
C.T.S.V. Dynamics case, which endorsed state takeover laws.

This

book therefore represents only small a portion of the background
and discussion from which my recommendation emerged.
While there are many bills pending in the Legislature on takeovers and takeover related act

ies such as poison pills,

supermajorities, and tiered offers, it should be noted that as
laws, the legislation would affect only California corporations.
Since there is a declining number of those corporations having
substantial business contacts, the e

on business conduct is

minimized.
Finally, I believe

cuss

Policy has the best
holders in mind when
issue.

State's
cuss

Given the obvious

the takeover
and client interests of Com-

mission members this has not been an effort
Senator Dan McCorquodale
March, 1988

of a State

ss task.
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CHAPTER
EXECUTIVE SU~~RY
BY SENATOR DAN McCORQUODALE
The Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights
and Securities Transactions having studied the issue of corporate
takeovers, submits the following cone sions and recommendations
to the Legislature:
Conclusions:
• A California corporate takeover law would be an ineffective
protection of corporations, workers and shareholders since it
would apply to a minimal number of corporations having business
contacts in the State.
• A national law requiring minimal standards of conduct for
corporations, bidders and investors would reduce jurisdictional
competition and claims among states.
• Problems associated with corporate takeovers such as depletion
of assets and resources, debt burdens to corporations and other
dislocations to the State's economy should be resolved as
issues separate from tender offer legislation.
Recommendations:
• The California Legislature should support federal preemption of
state takeover laws.
• The California Legislature should support state legislative
proposals which will add to the protection of shareholders and
pension investments.
state legislative
• The California Legislature
proposals relating to takeover activities when there is a
to small corporations and their
potential for economic hardsh
shareholders.

Dan McCorquodale is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Corporate
Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions and
represents the San Jose and Modesto areas in the California
legislature.
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The Recommendation
Thirty-seven states have passed some form of legislation to
restrict hostile corporate takeovers. Twenty-seven have restricted
offers. California has not and should not.
A California takeover law will effect relatively few corporations,
since few have either chosen to incorporate in the State or have
sufficient business contacts to come under the jurisdiction of the
State's Corporation Code Section 2115. A law will neither abet
nor deter raids of most corporations. The passage of takeover
legislation at this time would be an ineffective protection of
shareholders, workers and the state's economy, as well as a deception of public policy of the first order.
Without addressing specific legislative proposals, the Senate
Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions recommends federal preemption of all states'
laws relating directly to takeover activities. The preemption as
described by the Commission should be limited to takeover activities
and not infringe upon the appropriate state interests of corporate
governance and internal affairs.
A line should also be drawn to separate internal management affairs
of a corporation from takeover issues of corporate control. In
addition, problems often associated with takeovers, such as plant
closings or depletion of assets and resources, should be resolved
as separate issues.
This is not to diminish the seriousness of
these issues or their impact on California's economy, resources
and workers.
The recommendation is not intended to be prescriptive. California
should have a voice in determining federal standards, but it is
presumptuous to assume the actions of Congress and contradictory
to circumscribe the rules for other states.
Lack of Jurisdiction
In most issues of corporate control, California is effectively
preempted by other states, such as Delaware, by virtue of a
corporation having the ability to select a choice of law through
incorporation. Even if a corporation had a majority of its property,
payroll, sales, shareholder and its headquarters located in California,
would not exclusively come under California laws should
it choose to incorporate in another state.
The shocking reality is that despite having the sixth largest
economy in the world, California can claim authority over only
three Fortune 500 companies and less than four percent of New York
Stock Exchange listed companies. Corporate laws affecting TimesMirror, Wells Fargo or Atlantic Richfield for example are made not
in Sacramento or Washington, D.C., but in Dover, Delaware. The
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mer
of takeover leg
not have jurisdiction over

does

It is also quite clear that California cannot enact corporation laws
even if predisposed to do so, which would become as attractive
to corporate management as the laws of Delaware or other states
competing for incorporations.
It should be clear that not all of Delaware's laws adversely affect
shareholders' interests. In some instances such as the declaration
of dividends or valuation of acquisitions, Delaware law is quite
favorable to shareholders.
However, California should not enter in to a competition for incorporations which it cannot win without substantially redirecting
state law. The State should have the freedom to determine laws
based upon economic, social, cultural and historical justification
rather than a response to coercive competition between states.
Delaware as an example, has a free hand to enact corporate laws
which have relatively little effect on their own citizens except
to provide additional revenue in franchise taxes and a disproportional effect on other states ability to regulate corporations.
As a small state with a modest economy, Delaware is the overwhelming choice of incorporation for corporations having their
principal business contacts in other states.
In addition, Delaware courts have established a body of case law unrivaled by
other states. The incentives for Delaware incorporation are not
likely to be reversed by the passage of a California takeover law.
A law which would likely reverse past state policy.
Other states such as New York that have passed takeover laws with
less balance and equity than the Delaware takeover law at the behest
of their business lobbyists with such features as a five year prohibition on the divestiture of assets, lengthy disclosures and
long tender periods have not experienced a return of corporations
from Delaware. In most instances, state legislatures have reacted
to the intimidation of a
e corporation's threat to leave for
Delaware, by immediately enacting
tive legislation. This has
been the case in Arizona (Greyhound) , Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson) ,
New Jersey (Singer), Washington (Boeing), and Ohio (Goodyear) to
name a few examples.
The California legislature,
to
credit, has resisted
overreaction despite takeover attempts on some of the major
corporations in the state. Although California would like to provide a better business climate, that goal is unlikely to be realized
by legislation that has a narrow application of relatively few
corporations incorporated in California. California laws do not
protect Delaware corporations.
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California Alternatives
California has three alternatives:
(l) do nothing and continue to
abrogate authority over large corporations with substantial business contacts, (2) pass a takeover law which applies only to a
relatively few corporations, or (3) assert jurisdiction through
federal preemption of state laws by virtue of its Congressional
representation.
In light of these facts, the best alternative is
to attempt to assert jurisdiction through federal preemption of
state laws. Preemption would set a floor for shareholder protections and a ceiling for management prerogatives in the governance
of corporations. States would be free to set additional standards
above the floor or below the ceiling. With such a minimum federal
standard, even set at a base approximating existing Delaware law
(which is not being advocated) , states would be free to decide an
appropriate standard for governance of corporations with the certainty that Delaware or some other state would not continue the
downward spiral of shareholder rights.
There is nothing innately wrong with states having different standards for corporate behavior. What is divisive is the competition
to lower standards in the "race to the bottom." Minimal federal
preemptive standards would establish a finish line for the race to
the bottom.
In addition, the significance of multi-state claims and disputes
over choice of law would be minimized as' the .disparities in state
laws are restricted.
This position is not contrary to the states'
rights claim which was a major point of contention in the Indiana
takeover case. To the contrary, such a proposal would promote
states' rights. Differences in governance standards should reflect
regional anomalies, not state entrepreneurialism. To restate the
earlier question: Would California be better served being preempted
by Congress or preempted by the Delaware Legislature? The current
system in which a post office drop determines political and corporate behavior is totally irrational. It is an unimaginable
metaphor for democracy.
What is a more reasonable alternative?
should recognize two precepts:

A federal takeover law

(1)
It should be limited to the regulation of changes in corporate
control. Responsibilities for corporate law traditionally vested
with states should remain with states.
(2)
It must be consistent with the consideration of neutrality
among shareholders and unbiased between contending parties vying
for ownership as presumed by the Williams Act.
The purpose of any law should be to allow the shareholders to make
an informed decision regarding the ownership of a corporation free
from coercive offers from both bidders and management. With the
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changes in owner
corpora
s
to a sh t of corporate
equity to large pension funds perceptions of bias may have changed.
This is but another reason to reexamine federal law.
A Final Perspective
California has been affected by the loss of jobs, resources and
disruptions to the economy as much if not more than other states
due to corporate takeovers of the last few years. Some of this
disruption can be considered the price for the free movement of
capital.
Considering the state has long been a net importer of capital,
California has profited from a total increase in jobs and other
benefits to the overall economy. Some measure providing for the
protection of natural resources or sudden economic adjustment are
warranted, but they would be ineffective if their application is
limited to California corporations. Often the economic problems
associated with takeovers are a result of poor business judgement
and tactics in gaining or maintaining control of a corporation.
The State cannot correct problems of business judgement and often
lacks the authority to restrain harmful tactics.
The State's policy should be to unveil the myth of legal control
over corporations and restore jurisdiction to California. That can
only take place through federal legislation. Just as in the story
of the Emperor's New Clothes, California bills itself as the sixth
largest economy in the world without any control over the governance of the largest corporations doing business in the state. The
Commission should advise the state of the nakedness of its authority
and debunk the myth of state jurisdiction.
The Governance Commission
The California Senate created the Commission on Corporate Governance,
Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions, in 1986 to evaluate
laws relating to and practices of corporate management, investment
managers and investors, with particular concern to reconciling the
need to establish stability for corporations operating in or desiring
to locate in California with the fiduciary obligations of investment managers and pension fund trustees to prudently invest shareholder funds.
The Commission's membership represents prominent
members of the business, academic, investment and political communities. The Commission sponsors legislation and its members are
often called upon for consultation or testimony on corporation and
securities law issues before the Legislature.
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REPORT AND COMMENTARY BY
ON CORPORATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
As discussed and
meeting the following
members of the California
commentaries on the proposal outlined in
the subcommittee.

26, 1988

are four
letter by members of

(Text
members
The undersigned members of the Cal
islature desire to
express to you our support for the enactment by
Congress of the
United States of certain f
minimum standards governing
corporate takeover practices. We believe that recent events have
underscored the impractical
of current attempts at regulation
by the states. Corporate takeover activity is a national phenomenon that can only be regulated effectively at the national level,
in a uniform fashion that pre-empts confl
state laws.
In order to ensure that the federal standards cover the field and
yet do not overly restrict smaller or private transactions for
which there is less reason to intrude
state law, we suggest
that these standards be made applicable to all corporations with
a class of securities registered
12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or subject to the requirements of Section 15(d)
of that Act.
areas

We suggest that
of concern:
\1) Voting Rights. We
based on acquisition of
shares are held, or which
ic shareholders, be 1
business justification exists for
such limitations are otherwise
to insure fairness.
Examples
be where shareholders (
limitation, where the 1
the time any
s of that
the regulated nature of a
's
tinctions in voting power.

existing
a strong
imitations or where
circumstances designed
ju
ications would
}
approved the
shares prior to
public, or where
requ
disso-called "poison pills"
opportunity
, we would support
shareholder
after adoption in

(2)
"Poison Pills." We
in many cases operate to
to benefit from takeover
a prohibition on "poison
ls"
approval (other than management)

6

to continue in
feet, as
1 as
approval at
least once every three years thereafter (i.e., a "sunset" provision).

"

a

on the
se by
shares from a shareholder
less than one
unless one of the
formulas
s
to ensure that a shareholder does not
receive an unfair premium applies:
(i) the purchase price is equal
to or less than the market pr
the shares on the third day
following public announcement of a takeover bid or the thirty-day
average post-announcement market price (whichever is elected by
the target company); (ii) the shareholders have approved the transaction by a majority vote; or (i ) the same offer is made to all
shareholders or the sell
shareholder sells its shares pursuant
to an agreement entered into prior to the time that the selling
shareholder purcha
a
ificant interest.
(4)
"Fair Price." We support the "fair price" type of provision
adopted by several corporations and enacted into law in several
states and suggest that it be adopted at the federal level. Such
provisions
lly require a majority vote of the minority stockholders prior to a
iness combination with a substantial shareholder, unless the price to be paid is equal to or more than the
greater of:
(i) the highest price paid by the offeror in the past
two year periodi (ii) an amount which bears the same or greater
percentage relationship, in a tender offer situation, to the market
price prior to the announcement of the merger as the highest price
per share paid by the offeror during the tender offer bears to the
market price of the
immediately prior to the commencement of
the tender offer; or (
} an amount equal to the earnings per
share for the corporation's previous year multiplied by the then
price/earn
ratio of
offeror.
(5)
Schedule 13D Filing Deadline. We support shortening from ten
days to five days the period in which acquirors have to file an
initial Schedule 13D, and support a prohibition on the acquisition
of additional shares until the Schedule 13D has been filed.
(6) Open Market Purchases Following a Tender Offer. We believe
that where a bidder terminates a tender offer and immediately
thereafter engages
massive open market purchases, the purposes
of the Williams Act are significantly frustrated. Accordingly, we
advocate prohibiting acquisitions for thirty days following the
termination of a tender offer, or at least until the tender offer
would
expired by its original terms.
(7) Favoring Acquisitions in Excess of a 15% Interest by Tender
Offer. We believe that federal law should encourage acquisitions
of outstanding shares in excess of 15% of a corporation's outstanding
stock to be made by tender offer only, and therefore subject to the
Williams Act. Excepted from this requirement would be stock acquired involuntarily by gift or otherwise; stock acquired by statutory merger or consolidation; stock acquired during the previous
12 months that did not exceed 2% of the outstanding stock of that
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class;
b
business;
purchasers exempted by the
s
ss
owners
of 85% or more of the corporation's stock; and stock that is
acquired by a syndicate or other group that does not purchase additional shares after acquiring the required 15% or greater amount
except by tender offer or purchase from the issuer.
(8) Disclosure of Control Intent in Schedule 13D Statement. We
believe that the intentions of potential acquirers must be detailed
within their Schedule 13D filing.
If the acquisition of shares is
stated to be for investment purposes only, then any subsequent takeover bids should be prohibited until an intention to obtain control
has been disclosed and an appropriate waiting period has expired
or until the approval of shareholders (other than management) has
been obtained.
These proposed minimum standards were developed by the California
Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and
Securities Tranactions. No matter what form these proposed minimum
standards ultimately take, we believe that some measures for the
governance of corporate takeover activity need to be enacted at the
federal level.
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STATE OF

GEORGE

DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
600 S. COMMONWFAITH
LOS ANG.!! I 5, CAlifORNIA
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(213) 736.-2741

REPLY REFER TO:

FilE NO. - - - - - -

March 10, 1988

The Honorable Dan McCorquodale
Member of the Senate
State Capitol, Room 4032
Sacramento, CA ~5814
Dear Senator McCorquodale:
The Department of Corporations has reviewed the initial rough
draft of a proposed Resolution of the California Legislature
regarding corporate takeovers. This resolution would recommend
to the U. s. Congress the enactment of certain federal minimum
standards in this area and was proposed by a member of the SR 41
Commission's Subcommittee on Takeovers. The Department finds
itself supporting many of the sentiments expressed by Mr. Willie
R. Barnes in his February 19, 1988 letter to Michael J. Halloran,
the draftsman of the proposed resolution. In general, we believe
the proposed resolution is excessively and unnecessarily
detailed. Furthermore, the provision dealing with voting rights
is objectionable to the Department.
In our opinion, the proposed resolution would do better to focus,
in a straight-forward manner, on the need for a national, uniform
standard for takeovers accomplished by purchase of securities
rather than proposing such detailed and extensive provisions. We
believe this focus would better serve the SR 41 Commission, also.
Below, please find our specific comments:
1. As Mr. Barnes points out in his February 19th letter, the
provision for shareholder approval overrides substantially
diminishes (indeed, defeats) any minimum standards sought to be
adopted. The result of the shareholder override provisions is
that there may be no minimum standard at all.
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The Honorable

March 10, 1988
and Exchange
(Paragraph
two reasons for

2.
Commiss
(c) )

e

As proposed, this rule sets
limited disenfranchisement
standards (some wi
say
are no standards at all)
with respect to voting rights
common stock listed on a
national securities exchange or quoted on NASDAQ. As you
know, the appropriateness of these proposed standards also
is the subject of the California debate under the California
securities Law on minimum voting rights standards for
securities listed on the NYSE and ASE or designated national
market system securities on NASDAQ. Specifically, Senate
Bill 451 proposes to amend subdivision (o) of Corporations
Code Section 25100 to include proposed Rule 19c-4 standards.
This bill is presently before the California Legislature.
The inclusion of the proposed SEC rule in a proposed
resolution
the California Legislature to the U. s.
Congress states, in effect, that this is the California
position on minimum voting rights when in fact the
California Legislature has not yet spoken. As you know,
California has a long history
support for a one share,
one vote standard which we are hopeful will continue as
California's standard for common stock. Accordingly, we
recommend this provision be deleted from the proposed
resolution.

•

considering
standard for
equity
listed on national securities exchanges or
quoted on the NASD interdealer quotation system. This
legislation
HR 2668 (Rinaldo)
HR 2172 (Markey). In
our opinion,
would be preferable for the California
Legislature to lend its support to these bills, particularly
HR 2172, than to attempt to fashion other legislative
recommendations out of whole cloth.

3. We agree with Mr. Barnes' comment regarding the
appropriateness of the inclusion of Paragraph (g) in the proposed
resolution. The threshold for a freeze-out of minority
shareholders in a merger (whether it should remain at 90% or be
reduced to 85%) should be a decision of the Legislature in the
normal course of its deliberations and should not be presented in
the form of a resolution requesting action of the u. S. Congress.
4. We are uncertain why a restriction on the acquisition of more
than 15% of equity securities (Paragraph (m)) is necessary or
desirable. We believe greater explanation is required on the
part of the draftsman before this proposal can be analyzed
effectively.
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The

101 19 8

5.
need further
request the draftsman
Commission members as
these provisions are

j
l)
n) , we find we
we can comment. Consequently, we
to the SR 41
sought and why

These are weighty issues.
SR 41
comprises a
number of individuals with substantial practical experience in
the securities area and who devote many hours of their time to
the Commission. Many of the Commission members saw the
Subcommittee draft
f
at
conclusion of
last full Commiss
I strongly suggest that these
issues receive a complete hearing at a full Commission meeting
before a recommendation is made to the Legislature.
Very truly yours,

CHRISTINE W. BENDER
Commissioner of Corporations
(213) 736-3481
CWB:kw
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Members, Senate
Shareholder Rights
Dick Damm, Consultant
Senate Commiss
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Dear Mike:
I am in rece
1988 and the enclosed in tial
of the Cali
nia Legislature
enactment of certain federal
takeover activity.
Consi
t tee
to
standar
in our
staff
r
ing to writi
review and discuss

dat
ruary 2,
a proposed Resolution
to the Congress

Although
Co
ate Governance,
the ''
ssion") sets
so cal
"Delaware
at the last meeting
of state regulation in
nimurn federal standa
Resolution raises for me
I will want to deliberate
Resolution, in addressi
devices, intrudes extensi
corporate governance
eemption of state r
t on
federal legislation which would
in the traditional corporate
we are tr
i
a thin line,

ss
on
Transaction
ressing t
consensus of those
federal preemption
area combined with
initial draft
issues on which
ieve the draft
anti-takeover
general
to federal
oppose any
from regulati
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Michael J. Hal ran,
February 19, 1988
Page 2

for example) fit easil
in either category and achieving an
a
ropriate
ance
1 not
ise.
Nonetheless, the
potential erosion of the traditi
power of the states to
regulate the internal affairs of corporations is of concern.
Secondly, and historically, there has not been general support
for enactment of federal
nimum corporate standards and we run
the risk of federal preemption without a floor of minimum corporate
standards.
I believe, however, that this risk can be minimized
if our recommendations are narrowly defined.
With these general observations behind me, I do have a
few specific comments on the various provisions contained in the
proposed Resolution:
l.
Shareholder Approval Override. My reaction to the
shareholder approval override is that it defeats or diminishes
the objective sought to be achieved, i.e. minimum standards of
fairness.
Allowing a majority of the shareholders to limit the
voting rights of the minority is pretty much the status quo.
A
number of public companies, with the approval of shareholders,
have gone from one class of common to two classes of common, with
disproportionate voting rights between the two classes.
Some
have gone even further to restr
the voting power of a
shareholders once his ownership reaches a certain threshold (i.e.
15% of the outstanding shares).
I am having difficulty reconciling minimum standards
of fairness with the concept of shareholder approval override.
2.
Subdivision (c) Enactment Into Law of Restrictions
Contained In Proposed SEC Rule 19c-4 Prohibiting Restrictions on
Voting Rights is misplaced and should be eliminated.
Proposed
Rule l9c-4 would constitute a mini~um standard regarding the
types of voting securities permitted to be listed on a national
securities exchange or authorized for quotation reporting.
Proposed Rule 19c-4 addresses more a corporate governance issue
(i.e. One Share One Vote) rather than an anti-takeover measure.
In fact, some states, including California, prefer a true one
share one vote over the SEC's proposal.
Whether or not the SEC
adopts 19c-4, there is no reason for the Congress to take away
the power of the states in this basic corporate governance area.
3.
I am opposed to the inclusion of Subdivision (g)
in the Resolution. While Subdivision (g) is titled 'Assurance of
Right to Perform Second Step "Cash Out" Merger', it might also be
titled "Facilitation of Freeze-out of Minority Shareholders".
What Subdivision (g) will do is change existing California law.
As you know, of course, there are parallel provisions in the
present General Corporations Law (Sections 1101, lOOl(d) and 407)
-13-
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consummate a short
form merger under Section 1110 to
same objective.
Subdivision (e) to Section 1001
1101.1 do permit the
cash-out of minority shar
90\ threshold is not
met if the Commissioner
Corporations has approved the terms
and conditions of the trans-action in fairness of such terms and
conditions.
A similar out is
r insurance companies,
public utili ties and banks.
a determination is to be made
that freeze-out of minority
rs is appropriate at 85%
rather than 90%, I believe that
poli
decision should evolve
through the normal legislative
Subdivision (i) raises some interesting issues and
As
you know, of course, the significance of the exclusivity of the
appraisal remedy has been e
by the 1977 General Corporation
Law and the availability of f
ral private remedies.
In any
event, I question, however, whether this is the forum to deal with
these issues.
4.

a further exposition of its intended effect may be warranted.

5.
Subdivision (m) - Acquisition of Greater than 15%
Interest by Tender Offer Only.
Until I have had an opportunity
to explore the full ramifications
vision, I am withholding judgment.
I am not
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Dick Damm
state of California
Senate Office of Research
1100 J Street, Suite 650
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Dick:
A prior commitment requires me to be out of the state on the
day of the Commission's next meeting. Because the Commission may
take up at that meeting the proposal that California recommend
federal preemption in the takeover area, I thought I should make
my views known. Please
to circulate this letter to
other members of the Commission if you think it appropriate.
I fully support the proposal that California recommend
federal preemption. The principal argument in favor or
preserving state regulation
that competition among states
leads to the 11 best"
laws as corporate managers select
the state whose corporate statute they preceive as most efficient
and state legislators respond by enacting efficient statutes in
order to secure the revenues associated with in-state
incorporations.! However
argument might
to
s with

If, however,
, as they quite
management's
management's
1
interests in
selection of the most

lin this regard, it might

noted that over the period from

1960 to 1981, the percentage of Delaware's total tax collections
that came from its corporate
from 10.9% to
2 4 • 9% • R. Gil son, .=T~h~e:......::!L:::!l:a~w!!--a~n~d:......!:F_,i~n.,!.;a::l:Jn~c=e~o:..;;f..__::C~o::.::rn!:.J:::.o~r.l:!a:.l:t:.:.e~A~c~gu~.=i.=s~i:...l:t:..:i:.::o~n=s
1076, note 146 (1986).
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Dick Damm
February 19, 1988
Page 2
efficient state law, but, rather, one that provides managers at
least a base level of protection from hostile takeover
activity.2 The recent performance of the Delaware legislature,
it seems to me, brooks of no other explanation.
Although I favor a general statement supporting federal
preemption of state takeover regulation -- issues of national
importance should be resolved by Congress, not the Delaware
Legislature -- I do have some strong views concerning in how much
detail detail our position favoring a preemption position should
be set forth. I do not think it wise that we advance a
substantive position with respect to each of the areas as to
which we recommend federal preemption. To be sure, it is
important to indicate the general subjects as to which we
recommend preemption in order to cut off claims that we are
proposing a full scale federal displacement of state corporate
law. However, that concern can be met by detailing the general
areas of concern -- ~~ differential voting rights, poison
pills, second-step transactions -- without taking a position on
how each issue should be treated in federal legislation.
A number of points counsel in favor of such self-restraint.
First, on a substantive level, the empirical and legal literature
on each aspect of takeover regulation is voluminous. A review of
that literature adequate to formulate and justify substantive
positions (based on other than anecdote) would be an
extraordinarily time consuming enterprise and, frankly, one that
might well prove to be beyond the competence of a part-time
commission.
Second, expressing a substantive position on particular
issues cannot help but divert attention from what is our most
important point. With respect to substantive provisions, our
position is but one of many that have been expressed by different
groups in the course of Congressional hearings and reflected in
one or another of the bills that have been introduced in
Congress. California simply has no special position from which
to assert particular substantive outcomes.
Our unique position
concerns preemption. It is a singular event for a state to
advocate federal preemption of state law. That position
deserves, and will get, attention unless we allow it to be
diluted by debate on the particular terms of federal legislation.
I do not suggest that, at the appropriate time, California not
express its views on actual outcomes, but I do

2~

at 1076-77.
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Damm
February 19, 1988
Page 3
the wisdom of
issues should be

think it ill advised at
preemption with the merits
resolved.

Finally, I would resist
preemption point with
specific resolutions because
to make it more
difficult to garner support
So long as the
commission's only point is
s and
groups who may differ
appropriate resolution
of particular issues nonetheless can support preemption.
Because broad support for the Commission's position on preemption
is politically critical, I would
no~hing that made it more
difficult for anyone to sign on.
In short, I urge that
recommend preemption with
areas. We should not, at
outcomes with respect

do no more than
subject matter
, recommend particular
ect matters.

I apologize in advance

next week's meeting.
Best regards,

~L)J>«.J.-~_;
Ronald J'"' Gilson:::?'"'
Professor of Law

RJG: jd
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Michael J. Halloran,
Pillsbury, Madison &
225 Bush Street
san Francisco, CA 94120
Re:

Your memorandum dated February 2, 1988 to the
Subcommittee on
the Senate Commission
on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and
Securities Transactions

Dear Michael:
The subcommittee
time on the proposed resolution.
,
with no enthusiasm
that I write this
. However, I do feel that I must express myself. I have very carefully read the proposed resolution
and have given it considerable thought.
As a result, I have
concluded that I cannot
proposed resolution.
abdication of local control
Extreme care must be taken
to the Federal Government.
Casting
the proposed resolution
first
towards federalization
into Federal law would be
something
into the Federal sysof corporation law.
Once
difficult to
tem, it
best
change. on balance,
interests of Cali
Each area of the
numerous competing
case. To be complete,
into account.
The Cal
duce the same degree of
recently experienced
we would be taking a
delegation. On the
sional or
tional level, there
debate the issues
their nuances.
Evidently an
cently published

There are
considered in each
these interests
will not prosome
these issues have
Accordingly, I do not think
product
our congressional
whether congresconsidered at the nathoroughly
finer points and
e

Wall

was reStreet

Michael J. Halloran
February 17, 1988
Page 2

Esq.

Journal. I received several calls from people who read it. The
gist of the message was that they would resent an attempt to
legislate California's views of corporate law/morality on them.
The resolution may impress the California delegation but probably would be considered an affront by those of other states.
Passage of the resolution will obviously require expenditure of
public resources.
I am of the opinion that those resources
could be better spent on pursuits that will have a greater range
of support at the level of final action.
By a copy of this letter to Senator McCorquodale, I am asking that he record my opposition to the proposed resolution in
its present form or as may be modified when it comes up for consideration next Friday. Unfortunately, I have a previous commitment for February 26.
If it were not for that conflict, I
would attend and personally cast my vote in opposition.
Very truly yours,

RJS:mas
cc:

The Honorable Dan McCorquodale
Richard Damm ...........-
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CHAPTER II
STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TAKEOVERS:
BY JOHN POUND
I.

AN ECONOMIC VIEW

Introduction

In 1987, more than a
zen states
s
new legislation designed
to change the environment in which hostile takeovers occur. While
state activism on the takeover issue has been building steadily
since 1985, the developments of 1987 were unprecedented. As the
year closed, Delaware which had previously refrained from promulgating new takeover re
tions, also came forward with significant new legislative proposals. This action virtually ensures
that other states, which have until now remained on the sidelines,
will be compelled to offer new takeover initiatives. This document discusses the economic structure of recent state plans, their
potential effects on shareholders and corporations, and their
efficiency consequences for the states and the national economy.
II.

Types of Laws

Two primary types of antitakeover statutes have been introduced
and passed by states since 1985. A first type sets direct terms
and conditions under which business combinations may take place.
Examples are the New York State law, and the proposed Delaware
law. Typically, these statutes place explicit limits on the actions
of an outside shareholder who acquires controlling interest in a
target firm against the wishes of directors. The laws explicitly
forbid such hostile acquirers from taking further actions for a
specified period after the control position has been achieved. The
New York law forbids the controlling shareholder from consolidating
a merger with the target, selling assets, or otherwise restructuring
the target firm for five years from
date
acquisition. The
proposed Delaware statute conta s s
ar restr
effective
for three years after controll
interest is
The second type of recent statute
s
voting structure of
the target firm. The laws re
voting rights of shareholders who acquire 1
corporations' stock over
the explicit objection
target firm's management. When the
outside shareholder crosses a
ied ownership threshold without
management permission, the
attached to the acquired
block of shares are revoked.
can only
reinstated by a
majority vote of "disinterested" shares, defined as shares that
are not owned by either
large stockhol
or current management.
The ownership thresholds specified
most statutes (including
those of Massachusetts,
, and Oh ) are 20%, 33%, and 50%
of outstanding common shares.

John Pound is an Assistant Professor
Public Policy at the J.F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and is Director
of the Corporate Voting Re
Project.
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Both types of laws have generally contained novel legal features
relative to the first-generation state statutes that were struck
down by the Supreme Court in the late 1970's. Among these are the
"opt out" and "opt
" clauses
ity to
state
and out-of-state corporations
,
laws are structured
so that corporations residing
the state are automatically
covered unless management proposes and shareholders vote to "opt
out" of the new terms in favor of some other set of rules. Most
laws are also structured so as to allow out-of-state firms with
a substantial asset base in the state to "opt in" to the protections and structure of the statute. Out-of-state firms may generally become covered by the statute upon an affirmative vote of their
shareholders.
III.

The Economic Effects of the New State Antitakeover Statutes

The two new types of antitakeover statutes are often supported with
detailed arguments about their effects on the structure of the takeover market. However, both types of laws also have common, broad
effects on shareholders, management, corporate structure, and state
and national economic efficiency. This section summarizes both the
broad and the spec ic effects of the laws.
A.

The Balance of Power Between Shareholders and Management

The fundamental effect of all the new state takeover statutes is
to vest more power in the hands of management and the board of
directors of public corporations. Under the new laws, management
of a target firm faced with a takeover attempt has a broad-based
veto power over the ability of the bidding f
to proceed with
the takeover attempt. Under the New York type of statute, the
veto power is absolute: a takeover transaction simply may not go
forward without management consent.
the Indiana-style law,
a takeover is made more difficult. Without management consent, the
outside shareholder must plan and execute an offer whose success
is more costly and more uncertain than in the law's absence.
Both of these types
statutes thus shift the balance of power in
the corporate control arena towards management. Shareholders either
are prevented (under the New York law) or discouraged (under the
Indiana law) from transferring control of the corporation over
the objections of the Board of Directors. This creates additional
deterrence in the takeover market. Faced with the prospect of a
management veto, potential bidders may refrain from making investments in target corporations, or takeover bids against these corporations. A number of bids that would have been profitable under
the old laws will be unprofitable given the uncertainty and potential
costs associated with the new statutes.
B.

The Effects of Deterrence on Takeover Activity

The new state laws will definitely make hostile takeovers more
difficult to accomplish in the forseeable future.
It is difficult
to estimate the exact impact of the statutes on takeover activity,
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Act was neutral by the
in that
it did not vest additional
target management. It is therefore likely
the new state laws will have a
larger deterrent effects on takeovers than Jarrell and Bradley
find to have resulted from the imposition
federal takeover regulation.
Additional evidence on the potential
fects of the new
state laws comes from recent literature on the effects of antitakeover provisions on takeover activity. Two recent studies have
examined how firm-specif
antitakeover amendments, that vest more
power with target management,
feet takeover frequency and shareholder wealth. Pound (1987)
effects of so-called fair
price and supermajority antitakeover amendments on takeover activity.
He finds that these amendments s
ificantly decrease the frequency
of takeover bids, while not el
gains in those
takeovers that do occur. He also finds some evidence that management uses these amendments for their own protection and gain when
faced with unwanted
1987) finds a similar effect
associated with so-call
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enses. He finds
that
1 plans sign
frequency of successful
s aga st
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in some case
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, by contrast,
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Available evidence on
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defenses, Pound, Netter,
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additional
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1987) note two

takeover b
were
by the
imposition of new state laws. This is significant evidence,
showing that the new laws have
spec ic takeover
bids unprofitab
were
e undertakings.
, a recent SEC study
passage caused significant
to
corporations (Ryngaert and Netter, 1987).
is is once again consistent with a deterrent effect.
C

Deterrence and Corporate Investment

The deterrent effects of the new state statutes will also extend
to a second realm: large investments by active shareholders in
corporations will be reduced. Large investments in major corporations are documented to have salutary effects for shareholders
and the efficiency of the corporation. Large investors serve several important economic purposes even
they never launch takeover
bids against firms or otherwise attempt to gain control. First,
they have an economic incentive to act as monitors, assessing
managerial performance more closely than do small, dispersed shareholders. Second, they have sufficient power to negotiate with
management when problems arise either with managerial performance,
or with apparent conflicts of interest within the corporation.
Large shareholders are not always welcomed by management as these
roles tend to reduce managerial discretion. But they are important
influences on corporate efficiency.
Several theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate the salutary
effects of large shareholders on
1 incentives, corporate
efficiency, and shareholder wealth.
and Vishny (1986)
present an analysis of the potential
iciency gains that large
investors bring to the corporate environment, and show that it is
large. Ruback and Mikkelson (1986) and Holderness and Sheehan
(1986) document empirically that investors acquiring more than five
ownership in large corporations increase value and economic
They show that
is is true even in the absense of a
takeover bid. Holderness and Sheehan (1985, 1987) further document that large investors -- including majority investors
are not passive participants in the corporation. Rather, they
generally use their power
expertise to suggest strategic and
structural changes to management in order to increase corporate performance.
New state antitakeover laws will decrease the frequency with which
investors take these types of large positions in major corporations
for several reasons. First, under the Indiana law, accumulation
of a significant position leads to the loss of voting power -- to
disenfranchisement -- and thus negates the power of the large shareholder to monitor the corporation and effect change. Second, both
types of laws severely restrict the large investors' ultimate
courses of action, should management be unresponsive in the future
to suggestions for change. Large investors assume substantial risk
by purchasing large stakes in the corporation, and one compensation
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for as
is
b
d
manager l performance
degree
that the new state
s ility, they leave
large investors with no recourse should managerial quality deteriorate and adversely affect their investment.
D.

Effects of State Statutes on

tivity

A major argument advanced by some proponents of new state legislation is that by deterring takeovers, these new laws will increase
the productivity of corporations and thereby aid in economic
growth. Several arguments are made. F st,
is argued that the
threat of takeovers forces
to focus on short-term performance in order to keep stock prices
,
thus deters productive investment in plants, equipment, and research and development.
Second, it is argued that takeovers often occur against health corporations, and cause social and economic dislocation including
plant closures and job losses.
In the past three years, both of these arguments have been refuted
by a large body of empirical research. Generally, the research
shows that on average, takeovers are productivity-increasing, and
are undertaken against firms whose performance has fallen significantly below par. Moreover,
evidence shows that takeovers are
most often launched against f
that are laggards in making productive investments in plants, R & D, and productivity.
Several studies have examined the argument that takeovers prevent
firms from making productive
stments. Lehn and Jarrell (1985)
and Pound, Lehn, and Jarrell (1986) examine the characteristics of
targets of hostile takeovers compared to variety of groups of
"control" firms.
The authors find that hostile takeover targets
are generally characterized by lower levels of investment in reand
are
peers. They also
find that hostile targets are
lower capital expenditures per share.
s, the
reduce
profitable investment appears to
If anything, the
reverse is the case: takeovers occur
are failing to
make the investments needed to stay
Several other, more recent
whether takeover
targets tend to be worse or
than other firms at
the time of the
contest.
s find that targets
are characteriz
by decl
performance, measured
by a wide variety of economic
Martin, Loderer, and
McConnell (1987) find
t
to be characterized by a long history of
e relative to firms
in the same industry. Morek,
Vishny (1987) find
that targets tend to be characterized by low performance, as measured
by whether assets are being ut ized as efficiently as they could
be in the pre-takeover
These f
takeovers
to be productivity-enhanc
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Martin, Loderer, and McConnell also
sent
evidence
suggesting that post-takeover changes in targets' internal organization are related to their pre-takeover performance. Specifically,
they find that top management
to
after takeovers, in
targets whose pre-takeover performance was decl ing.
In contrast,
little management change is found
those targets whose pre-takeover performance is at or above industry norms. This suggests that
management changes occur when takeovers are aimed at improving an
under-performing firm. The evidence also shows that some takeovers
occur for "synergistic" reasons, in which two healthy firms find
mutual efficiency benefits from entering into a business combination.
In these cases there is no "punitive" effect on target
management as a result of the takeover.
The evidence on job loss from takeovers is more preliminary than
are the foregoing results, but militates in the same direction.
Measuring takeovers' effects on job loss presents difficult methodological problems. But existing studies (Medoff, 1986) show that
takeovers do not result in more job loss. Some plant closings and
other economic adjustments are more vivid in the presence of takeovers, as public attention is drawn by the takeover transaction
itself. But far more job loss occurs as a matter of normal business
practice in firms and industries not characterized by takeover
activity.
Overall, the new state takeover statutes cannot be supported on the
premise that by deterring takeovers, they will increase the economic productivity of job base in the state or the nation as a
who
Indeed existing evidence suggests that if anything, precisely
the opposite will be the case. By
firms from the n~~d
to be respons
to
stors, the new state laws are likely to
make firms slower to adapt to change in world and national markets.
This will protect organized vested interests -- both current management and current workers -- but will not help either the consumers,
the labor force, or managers taken as a whole.
E.

Effects on Management Incentives

The new state laws create a perverse combination of changes for
corporate managements, which are likely to be inimicable to their
interests in the long run. First, they insulate managements from
having to make active decisions about whether to defend against
some takeover bids. Second, and concurrently, they set up rigid
new limits to managerial discretion that may tie managers' hands
in the longer term.
Prior to the generation of state laws, a management wishing to resist
a takeover bid had to expend significant costs -- reputational and
resource costs -- in order to accomplish its goal. Lawsuits were
a common form of takeover defense designed to force bidders to
withdraw their unwanted bids by imposing additional costs on the
process (Jarrell, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1987). More recently, many
managements have engaged in restructuring of corporations in order
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s, managements
defensive strategy that

The need to make such an
s numerous benefits relative to the
new state
laws. First, managers must signal to the market, by active decision,
their opinion about the current b
s information to
the market about the motives and qual
management and the value
of the firm.
Several studies
management's defensive commitments convey s
important information
to the market (Pound, 1987;
Vishny, 1986; Jarrell,
1985). Shareholders learn about the motives and effectiveness of
formation to isolate particularly good or bad managements, and
in assessing the profitability
particular takeover bids.
Second, by deterring some bids
, new state laws
also deprive shareholders of
about the
potential value of their firm.
Many studies have shown that takeover bids convey signif
informat
to the market about firm
value (Bhagat, Brickley, and Lowenstein, 1987; Pound, 1987; Bradley,
Desai, and Kim, 1983; Bradley, 1980).
the new state
statutes, more bids would occur.
Some of them would prove too
low, and therefore be defeated by managements' discretionary
defensive actions. But the mere
of a bid informs shareholders about the value that an
outs
investor places
on the firm's assets. With the new state statutes some of the informational effect is lost along with deterred takeover bids.
Ultimately, managers may find the lack of flex
that is implied by the new state statutes to
even
sof
The laws remove from
Indiana
scretion
ass
laws) .
and reacting to
when
s
Corporate management is
corporate charter
options are limited on
own shareholders. The
-- and thus explic
activity are unlikely,
imposition of blanket
in the long run, to
F.

Coercion

The New Statutes and

Another primary argument
state takeover statutes is
under law in order to
ploitation. This argument rests
shareholders are frequently
selling the target firm,
the target separate. This
persed structure of share
sed share ownership means
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in as a group with a potential acquirer. Faced with a bid,
no individual shareholder feels any power to prevent the bid from
being successful by not tendering his shares. Moreover, sharemay bel
that by not tendering, they will lose the
, wh e having no deterrent effect on the bid. Thus
s may tender into offers that they do not in fact
want to accept, because they have no alternative.
This problem has been argued to create a need to vest more power
management to block takeover bids. Proponents of new state
statutes (and other antitakeover devices) argue that an empowered
management can represent the interests of shareholders and deter
bids that shareholders would prefer not to accept. The New York
style laws accomplish this by preventing a hostile acquirer from
fecting a business combination at all without the formal approval
of management. The Indiana style laws accomplish this by forcing
large shareholder who violates management dictates to seek
voting enfranchisement from other shareholders. The idea in this
case is that outside shareholders should have the right to decide
whether they want to confer voting power -- and some element of
control -- to
large shareholder, independent of each individual
shareholder's dec ion whether to sell shares.
There are three problems with using this reasoning to justify the
new state statutes. The first problem is that a matter of law, the
coercion problem should be precluded by existing state corporate
codes. Delaware and most other state codes explicitly prevent a
majority shareholder, or any group of shareholders acting as a
majority, from taking any action that would expropriate the minority.
This prevents any successful bidder from expropriating the wealth
of non-tendering, minority shareholders.
If the successful bidder
(and now controlling owner) cannot expropriate the wealth of nontendering shareholders, then there can be no significant coercion,
because there are no costs from refusing to tender into an inadequate
offer. Shareholders are only coerced if they believe that by refusing to tender into offers that are inadequate, they may lose
wealth because control will be transferred and they will be denied
the tender offer premium.
The second reason that the coercion argument cannot be used to
support the new state statutes is empirical. A large body of
existing evidence provides evidence that coercion does not appear
to be a major problem in most takeover contests. Specifically,
the literature shows that there is in fact no loss from refusing
to tender into an offer (Bradley, 1980). Comment and Jarrell (1987)
also measure directly whether offers that are structured so as to
be potentially coercive -- particularly partial and two-tier tender
offers -- expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. They
provide evidence that all shareholders -- including non-tendering
shareholders -- gain substantially even in two-tier tender offers.
This evidence makes the coercion argument even harder to sustain,
by showing that potentially coercive tender offer instruments have
not typically been coercive in practice.
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The New State Laws and the Structure of Corporate Governance.

In addition to their direct effects on takeover activity, corporate
investment, corporate productivity, and shareholder choice, the new
state antitakeover laws also contain fundamental and adverse implications for the role of shareholder voting in corporate oversight.
The laws adversely affect both the structure of shareholders' voting
rights, and to the use of
proxy voting system as a vehicle for
overseeing management.
New York law, restricting all takeover activity not approved by
target management, effectively revokes completely the right of sharehal
to dec
about a fundamental -- indeed the fundamental -aspect
corporate structure and control. By preventing takeovers,
the New York law also puts new pressure on the proxy voting system.
Under the law, the only strategic option open to an acquirer facing
a hostile target management is to launch a proxy contest. Proxy contests have long been thought to be a very inefficient means of gaining
corporate control and influencing corporate management, due to problems
in
structure of the proxy voting system. Recent evidence has begun
to document inefficienc
in the proxy voting system, including a
significant pro-management bias in proxy voting laws and behavior
(Pound, 1988a,bi Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1987; Heard and Sherman,
1987). To the degree that the New York law forces bidders into use
of proxy fights, it introduces more stress into an already poorly
performing voting process, and introduces new costs and inefficiencies
into the process of corporate control.
The Indiana law mirrors and extends these adverse consequences for
the structure of shareholder voting. First, the law breaks with
virtually all state tradition in corporate law by departing from
neutrality in the allocation of voting rights among common stockholders. The law's specific, arbitrary revocation of voting rights
associated with large shareholdings opens the door to further manipulations of voting rights law, with detrimental implications for the
stability of corporate oversight and corporate structure. Moreover,
the Indiana law potentially creates a legal conflict between federal
exchange listing standards and the voting rights provisions of state
law. Voting rights listing standards are moving, under the current
SEC, towards a universal one-share, one-vote requirement. Any corporation covered by an Indiana-style law is by definition in violation
of this standard. This could lead to a major conflict between state
and federal jurisdiction in the voting rights arena.
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L
the New York law,
sis,
and new stress, on the
voting. As is
true under the New York statute,
scourage outside
shareholders from launch
instead lead them
to launch proxy contests.
, a potential
acquirer facing a reca
mount a proxy challenge to avoid trigger
ranchisernent" threshold at
which his shares lose
power. But more important, and
unlike the New York style statutes, the Indiana law also effectively
creates proxy contests whenever a shareholder does indeed choose
to cross the ownership threshold -- either
to a tender offer,
or simply due to acquiring a large stake
target corporation.
This is because the law
s
s to vote to
ide
whether large shareholders
d be ent
to vote. To the
degree that the proxy voting system
inefficient and even biased
toward management, this puts stress on the voting system and creates
significant additional costs.
Thus, both the Indiana and New York style statutes place direct
stress on the system of shareholder voting in addition to the costs
they create by deterring takeovers and active corporate investment.
Both laws force more takeover conflicts to
resolved through the
voting system directly. Empirical ev
e suggests that this
system is, under current laws and regulations, probably the least
;._.li-.l.IL:nk,dnsh-ttrc:m::;l
ncJ
Ci
l
fc
es~rt
corporate policy. Indeed were this not the case, proxy contests would
be used by potent
more
,
stead of more costly
offer acquis
ers. Forcing more governance conflicts
into the proxy voting system is 1
to create significant legal
and economic problems, and further weaken the effectiveness of
shareholder oversight.

In
short term, states
lation should probably wa
pursuing new
it is important to recogni e
are alternat
s
states
of corporate control that
either the New York or
section briefly reviews several
A.

Let Corporations and

s

le policy formufrom the federal government
lation. However,
viewpoint, there
the process
consequences of
statutes. This
alternatives.
Own Protections

The most obvious, and
t
response from states
to the takeover question is to recognize that corporations and shareholders should be free to set their own protections and guarantees
in the area of corporate control. In the past few years, most major
changes in the structure of
t secure as much
or more protection from
s than do either
of the new types of state antitakeover laws. Examples are supermajority amendments, classified board amendments, and dual-class
recapitalization schemes. Dual c
lizations are in
fact a more s
if
current state

law, as they effectively remove from outs
ders the right
to vote on all important decisions relating to corporate control.
al
free to make
types of changes under
states,
evidence shows that they use this
produce a wide variety of results.
Some corporations
relatively unprotected, while others have revoked all power
from outside shareholders. This evidence both suggests that there
is no need for sweeping statewide changes in corporate law.
Individual corporations can and do set their own processes and protections
as a part of the contract between shareholders and management.
This does not imply that there is no further role for changes in
state takeover laws.
Rather, it suggests that one appropriate
focus for new policy should be on making sure that the solution
arrived at in each corporation is in fact efficient and reflective
of shareholder and management preferences. For example, state laws
could give outside shareholders the explicit right to make proposals
for new charter changes, or the rescission of old charter provisions,
on the management proxy. This would reduce the costs of negotiation
between shareholders and management.
State laws could also require
that corporations disclose annually the structure of their corporate
charter to shareholders. Currently, this information is provided
only when a significant charter change is proposed. At other times,
i t is often difficult or impossible for outside shareholders to
determine the current structure of the corporate charter in matters
relating to corporate governance and corporate control.
One important policy approach is thus to encourage corporationspec ic solutions to the takeover problem. This approach encourages
ficiency to the degree that shareholder voting actually serves
to reflect shareholder preferences. While recent evidence raises
concerns about the efficiency of the voting process, voting in
individual corporations is certainly a preferable alternative to
sweeping policy changes at the state level.
B.

Adopt the "Vote and Tender" Solution

A simple and direct policy change, that directly addresses possible
ficiencies in the takeover process, is suggested by Bebchuck's
analys
of the coercion problem in hostile takeovers.
The change
would require that shareholders vote on tender offers at the same
that they tender.
This law, as argued in Section III.E.,
directly addresses a potential distortion that may exist in the
tendering decision.
The Indiana and New York style takeover laws
claim to address this problem but in fact fail to do so. As argued
in Section III.E., adopting the vote-and-tender rule would improve
the efficiency of the takeover process, and give shareholders a
better voice in takeover decisions, without imposing large new costs
on the system. A variant of this policy currently governs control
transactions under British law.

c.

Merit Regulation of Takeover Activity

There may be some takeover bids that carry significant adverse
consequences for particular states' economies, workforces, taxpayers,
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or natural resources.
several of these
Some of these
types of takeovers
external costs -- that is,
costs not borne by
or the target firm -- and thus
cause genuine efficiency concerns. It is reasonable to ask how
states should deal with spec
takeover bids that fall into this
category.
A first response is that the structure of state government creates
a mechanism that reacts to specific and problematic takeovers.
Several states have actively intervened to slow or stop particular
takeover transactions over the past year. The impetus for such
action usually comes from
ac
state legislature.
An important question for policy is whether a more formal channel
for reviewing problematic, specific takeover transactions should
exist. There are arguments in favor of such a system. Leaving
such authority to de facto operation of the legislative system may
be a very imperfect and costly way of identifying genuinely problematic
takeover bids. The current system may prevent some bids from
proceeding that are in fact efficient, while failing to stop some
bids that are in fact problematic.
~t would be a dangerous precedent to create formal state review of
individual takeover transactions without careful consideration of
whether such a system could function effectively and free from bias
and political influence. Such a system might also be viewed as
unconstitutional. But it is also possible that some process of state
review, and the enunciation by states of specific problems that might
cause the review process to be invoked, might be a preferable approach
to dealing with specific, problematic takeovers than are either
sweeping new state takeover restrictions, or the current ad-hoc
legislative process.

D. Utilize Exi

1

Finally, it is
ortant not
existing federal authorities
the
takeover arena. The Department of Just
the Federal Trade
commission are charged wi
preventing
ss combinations that
could lead to excess
market power.
ss combinations in
many industries must be approved
one or more federal authorities (for example, communications
power generation). These
authorities should ensure
cer
economic inefficiencies
could result from some
ci
takeover bids do not occur.
State vigilance, and active
eration with these federal
authorities, can help to
litate against particular inefficient
takeover transactions. However, states should also resist the
temptation to induce federal
ities to impose costs on the
vast majority of efficient takeover transactions, even if these
transactions are unpopular with certain vested interests.
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WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS FOR THE STATE UNDER CTS?
BY SUSAN HENRICHSEN

LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
Introduction
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Supreme Court
declared an Illinois statute regulating tender offers unconstitutional
on commerce clause grounds. Subsequently, lower courts struck down
turn,
a number of state laws regulating takeovers. The states,
attempted to find new approaches and many states passed so-called
"second-generation" takeover
In April, 1987, the Court reached a very different conclusion with
respect to one of the "second-generation" laws. In CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 95 L.Ed.
67 (1987), the Court upheld
Indiana's Control Share Acqu
Act aga st both commerce clause
and supremacy clause chall
s.
e that decision, still more
states have passed takeover laws; a majority of the states now have
such provisions.
The Edgar v. MITE Case
The Supreme Court in
, 457 U.S. 624 {1982),
struck down an Illino s statute regu
takeovers. The only
thing a majority of the justices agreed
was that the Illinois
law violated the commerce clause. F
(Justices Burger,
White, Stevens, O'Connor and
1)
this conclusion, while
three (Justices Burger,
B
) determined the Illinois
law was preempted by the
Act, a federal law regulating
tender offers. Three justices (Justices Marshall, Brennan and
Rehnquist) found the case moot and consequently said nothing at all
about the substantive issues.
Although the majority opinion
ssed preemption, only three
justices found the Illino
law was preempted by the Williams Act.
This conclusion of Justices Wh
and Blackmun (the plurality)
was based on the
finding
Illinois law frustrated the
purposes of the Williams Act. The plurality concluded the Congressional aim was neutral
as between the bidder and incumbent management. Since the Williams Act struck a balance between the interests
of the offeror and the target corporation, any state law that upset
this balance would be preempted. Id. at 632-634.

Susan Henrichsen is Deputy
California.

General for the State of

s
s in particular in
Illinois statute gave offense.
Illinois law provided for a 20-day pre~cornmencement period,
filing
a r~g1stration statement
the Illinois
State and commencement of the
fer.
During
iod, the
feror could not discuss
terms of the offer,
management
the target corporation would be.free to
voice
ir views.
Second, the statute provided for a hearing
on a tender offer, without providing a deadline within which the
hear
must be held, raising the possibility of an indefinite
delay in the tender offer. Finally, the substantive fairness of
the tender offer was to be reviewed by the Illinois Secretary of
State; the plurality concluded Congress had intended that shareholders be free to make the
own decisions.
Id., at 639-640.
The CTS Case
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987)
involved a different statute, drafted to avoid the defects of the
Illinois law, and a very different result.
In CTS, Indiana's
Control Share Acquisition Act was upheld against both commerce
clause and supremacy clause challenges.
The Indiana law provides that "control shares" in an "issuing public
corporation" will not have voting rights unless such rights are
granted by a vote of the majority of the disinterested shareholders
at the next regular shareholders' meeting. The person holding
such shares can require a special meeting to be held within 50 days
if he or she files an "acquiring person statement," requests the
meeting and agrees to pay the expenses of the meeting.
The Indiana law applies to any corporation incorporated in Indiana,
unless
corporation amends its articles or bylaws to opt out
of
Act. The law applies only to an "issuing public corporation,"
defined as an Indiana corporation with:
1)
2)
3)

one hundred or more shareholders;
its
incipal office or substantial assets in Indiana; and
either:
a)
b)
c)

more than ten percent of its shareholders in Indiana;
more than ten percent of its shares owned by Indiana
residents; or
at least ten thousand shareholders in Indiana.

A "control share" is defined as a share that, but for the provisions
of the act, would provide voting power equal to or greater than
any of three thresholds:
20 percent, 33 1/3 percent, or 50 percent.
The effect of the Indiana law is that a person acquiring 20 percent
or more of the voting power of an Indiana corporation that meets
the "issuing public corporation" definition has no voting power
unless such power is granted by a vote of the disinterested shareholders.
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Distric

commerce clause,
the
rever
, concludthe provisions
s limited effect
's interest in
s corporations and in

and

t

Court of Appeals a

ing that the Indiana statute
of the purpose of the Wil
on interstate commerce was
"defining the attributes o
protecting shareholders "

Crucial to the Court's decis
finding that the purpose
of the Indiana law was "to
ders of Indiana
corporations, a purpose accomplished by allowing the shareholders
to determine collectively
change
control
is
e. Id. at 86.
11

In its preemption analysis, the Court noted that although it was
not bound by the MITE plurality, the Indiana Act passes muster
even under [that] broad interpretation of the Williams Act."
Unlike the Illinois law that may have operated to favor management
over bidders, the Indiana statute protects independent shareholders
aga st both those parties.
placing investors on an equal
footing with the bidder, the Indiana law promotes one of the purposes
of the Williams Act.
Id. at 80.
11

The law's stated purpose of
ting shareholders was also
essential to the Court's commerce clause analysis. The Court
noted thab the creation of corporations is a matter of state. law
as is the definition of the rights acquired by purchasers of a
corporation's shares. The Indiana law, in defining or restricting
voting rights, for the legitimate purpose of protecting independent
shareholders, was within the state's traditional power and province.
Id. at 8 6.
In
contrast
, the Court in CTS expressed
no devotion to
a
corporate
control unfettered
state
the latter
case was not concerned with
takeovers. Other than a
erence to the potent lly coerc
feet of some takeovers,
the Court's discussion of their value is largely limited to a
footnote, ob
that
"
and
ity of tender offers
vary widely.
at 87,
. 13.
11

__
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F
, unlike the MITE
CTS is seemingly
unconcerned over the
of the Indiana law
on tender offers. While c
a lack
evidence for the claim
that the Act will limit
successful tender offers, the
Court nevertheless concedes
Act will 1
deter such offers
to some degree.
. at 81,
88.
s result, however,
alters neither the-preemption nor the commerce clause analysis, as
both the mechanism and the purpose of the Act are within the state's
traditional powers and
sts of prescrib
the attributes of
shares in its corporations
shareholders.
Ibid.

Existing State Laws
In structuring a state
law,
ipal issues must
be
ssed and
substantive provisions of the law,
corporations to which
shall apply, and the control
transactions that shall trigger the law's provisions. State laws
currently in effect have resolved these issues in different ways.
Although state takeover laws differ somewhat in their definitions
and application, in general such laws impose specified requirements
or restrictions on an "acquiring person," defined as one who
acquires in excess of a specified threshold level of a target
corporation's voting stock. The substantive provisions of such
laws are generally drawn from one or more of four principal
approaches, discussed below.
Indiana'a law is typical of the "control-share" approach.
Such a
law provides an acquiring person's shares shall not have voting
power unless such power is conferred by a vote of the .shareholders.
The "business combination 11 or "freeze-out" law regulates specified
business combinations between a corporation and an acquiring
person.
In general, such laws prohibit business combinations such
as mergers, liquidation or sale of assets for five years after an
unfriendly takeover.
The "fair price" law is probably the
in conjunction with one of the other
protects shareholders who are bought
two-tiered tender offer by requiring
those remaining shareholders, unless
directors vote otherwise.

most common, either alone or
approaches. Such a law
out in the second state of a
payment of a "fair price" to
the shareholders or board of

The least common approach
the "control-share cash-out 11 law.
Such a law requires a person who exceeds a specified ownership
threshold to purchase any shareholder's shares, upon demand.
The second issue to be dealt with is the definition of the "target
corporation;" that is, the corporation which is the subject of the
takeover or tender offer. Two criteria employed by most current
state takeover laws are the corporation's place of incorporation
and its economic ties to the state.
Most states have applied their laws only to "domestic" corporations
-- those incorporated in the state. At least five states, however,
including Arizona, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina and
Washington, have enacted takeover laws that also apply to out-ofstate corporations with a substantial economic presence in the state.
Those laws generally apply only to those out-of-state corporations
that have substantial assets, a significant number of shareholders,
and their principal office or primary place of business in the state.

-36-

Even those states
generally inc
some
Indiana
,
example
have their principal
f
that have more than 10
more than 10 percent of the
or at least 10,000 sharehol

corporations
ia as
1. The
corporations that
assets in Indiana and
in Indiana,
Indiana residents,

The final issue is the
transactions shall trigger
this has simply been a question
of voting power. The law's
person or entity acquires
corporation's voting stock.
the Indiana law, if fairly coromon.

s or control
s. For most states,
threshold percentage
whenever any
of a
20 percent, used in

Validity of Current State Laws Under CTS
MITE provides some guidance as to what states may not do, while
CTS sets forth some guidel
s for what states may do. Clearly, a
statute of the type struck down
MITE,
ich directly regulates
tender offers by submitting
to
ite delays and allowing
state
icials to prevent such an
from going forward, goes
too far.
The law upheld in CTS was cast in a completely different light.
The Court characterized that
as one defining the attributes of
shares in a states' corporat
s, and compared it to other statutes
of unquestioned validity which also affect voting rights and
changes in control, such as provisions
classified boards or
cumulative voting. The purpose of the law was one legitimately
within a state's
shareholder protection.
Of the four types
control-share acquis
with some sha
s
such a statute may re
tender offer, such a
will
long as the delay is not unrea
consummation of a tender
WilliamsAct, a not unreasonable
America, supra, 95 L.
.2d at

obvious a
stic corporations
ss le. Even though
consummation of a
statute invalid, so
Court in CTS found the
60
maximum of the
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.

It also seems likely
be upheld.
Such
laws clearly are for the
lder protection and are
specifically designed to
al
coercive
aspects of tender of
discus
by the Court. Id.
at 87. Furthermore, such
are
ess burdensome on
interstate commerce than the control-share type statute.
The validity of controlthe purpose is shareholder
laws are rationally related
Court would find such laws
they favor neither bidder nor

laws is less clear. Again,
, and the provisions of such
It seems unlikely the
lliams Act, since
promote the purpose

of protecting independent shareho
laws may, however,
p
a more significant burden on
market for corporate
control. Neverthless, under the reasoning of CTS, such laws might
well be permissible.
le
scus
here is
s combination or freeze-out type statute. Such
a law prohibits transactions
as mergers or sa
of assets
between a corporation and an acquiring person for five years after
acquisition unless the acquisition was approved by the board
of directors. Unlike the approaches discussed above, this approach
places a great deal of power in the hands of the target
corporation's management, at the expense of both the bidder and
the independent shareho
It might therefore be struck down
on preemption grounds.
Although the business combination law deals with a subject matter
that is commonly within the area of state regulation (that is,
mergers and sale of assets), it does so in a manner that can hardly
be characterized as promoting shareholder welfare or autonomy. The
law permits a board of directors, by refusing to consent to an
acquisition, to prevent an acquiring person from exercising control
for five years and allows the independent shareholders no say in
the matter whatsoever. Such a law might very well be vulnerable to
a challenge on commerce clause grounds.
These problems might be alleviated by eliminating any reference to
approval of the initial acquisition by the board of directors and
by providing that the prohibited transactions may take place upon
approval of the independent shareholders. Such a change would
maintain balance between the bidder and management and provide
shareholder protection, making the law far less vulnerable to
claims of preemption.
a law would still be far more likely to deter tender offers
the Indiana law upheld in CTS. An offeror under that law
could know, prior to completing-a-tender offer, whether or nut its
shares would have voting power. Under the business combination
law, however, an acquiror would not know whether or not a
transaction could be carried out until the transaction was
proposed and put to a vote, long after the initial acquisition.
Applicability of State Laws to Out-of-State Corporations
most uncertain issue for states after CTS may well be the
question of the permissible reach or jurisdiction of state
laws. This is a complex subject, discussed only briefly
here.
The Illinois law struck down in MITE applied to out-of-state
corporations, so long as the corporation had 10 percent of the
class of securities subject to the tender offer owned by Illinois
residents and had its principal office and at least 10 percent of
its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois. The impact of
the law on out-of-state corporations and thus on interstate
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commerce was a
It should be noted,
Illinois law were probably
dec ion; the Illinois
even if it applied only to
Illinois.

down the law.
provision of the
the Court's
struck down
incorporated in

The Indiana law applies
to Indiana
ions. The
emphasis in CTS on a state's power to create corporations and to
define the attributes of shares in
corporations seems so
fundamental to the Court's reasoning,
there is little in CTS
to support the proposition that state takeover laws may properrybe applied to out-of-state corporations.
A state takeover law appcl
le to out-of-state corporations is
vulnerable to attack on one of the most fundamental commerce
clause grounds; namely, that
adversely affects interstate
commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.
The Massachusetts law may have avoided this pitfall by applying
its law to out-of-state corporations only if their state of
incorporation has no such law.
If a state law sets economic
criteria that can only be met in one state (e.g., applying the law
assets or with their princ
office in the state) and
incorporates the Massachusetts provision as well, then only one
state's law would apply.
The benefits of a law applicable to out-of-state corporations
would still have to outweigh its effects on interstate commerce.
The Court in CTS found the Indiana law's effect on interstate
commerce "justified by the State's interests in defining the
attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting
shareholders.'' Id. at 88. Although the first of these interests
is missing where a law applies to out-of-state corporations, the
second could still be present. Such a law is not likely to
survive a commerce c
significant
portion of the
are located
in the state.
Finally, the greater the
and
more s
ficant the
contacts of the out-of-state corporation with the state seeking
to impose its law, the more 1
ly
law would withstand
constitutional challenge. It could be argued that the interest
a state has in regulating
s of a different nature, than
its interest in the affa
of an out-of-state corporation which
is a substantial presence
the state. A law may therefore be
less likely to be struck down if
includes such criteria as
principal office and substantial assets, as well as significant
numbers of shares of shareho
, in
state.
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WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND
OF
REGULATION?
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF DELAWARE INCORPORATIONS ON CALIFORNIA'S
SOVEREIGNTY AND CORPORATE LAW?
BY ROBERT MONKS AND WILLIAM LERACH

Preemption is a term that technical
refers to the explicit
(or implicit) assertion by the federal government of jurisdiction
in an area that had previously been left to action by the states.
But in the case of corporate law, one state has de facto preempted
the other forty-nine. California corporation law ·has in practical
effect been "preempted" by Deleware. The second-smallest state
geographically, Delaware is now "home" to the bulk of the Fortune
500. The legal function of the law of corporations allows a company
to have nothing more than a mail drop to designate Delaware as
its domicile, thus permitting its insiders to take advantage of
the many corporate protections and benefits that Delaware provides
to corporate management and directors. This problem has been
exacerbated in recent years as many of the largest companies
previously organized under California law reincorporated in
Delaware -- Potlatch, Occidental Petroleum, Times Mirror, Disney
and Wells Fargo among them. The main physical presence of these
companies remain in Californ
Many, if not most, of their
employees are California residents. The only difference is the
legal fiction of filing some documents that transforms the company
into a Delaware corporation. California is now the georgraphical
domicile of a large number of the "Fortune 500" but the legal
domicile of only three.
There is no obligation that a corporation have any real connection
with the state from which it receives its corporate charter;
there is also no requirement that a corporation doing business
in a particular state also be incorporated in that state. Thus,
from the beginnings of .the existence of large corporations following
the Civil War, the corporation
of the various states have
been involved in a "race to the bottom"l in order to attract
the franchise tax revenues
1
iness resulting from
being a desirable corporate haven. Under the Constitution, of
course, each state is obl
to g
"full faith and credit"
to the laws of the other states s
e an action that is legal
in one state, such as a
of 16-year-olds, is valid in all
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in Washington, D.C. He has served as the Director of the Federal
Retirement Thrift Investor Board and as Administrator of the
Department of Labors Office of Pension Welfare.
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and anti-trust class actions
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rs, even

ones

not

marriage under age 18.
most
s.

s been
having
an experienced
are
needs in
a
and rapid
ic observers,
,
e
itable business
of selling its special
law2 -- which
is uniformly attract
,
and the corporations themselves at
of shareholders nationwide.3
This includes recent
continued Delaware's
decades-long history of accomodating corporate interests:
corporations can now el
s' 1
lity in cases of
negligent breaches of
duty.
In another step
backward towards the
Ages, Delaware is currently
contemplating whether or not it
clone legislation in the
wake of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, in order to
remain competitive with the other states that have done so. To
protect its state's
1
incorporations, the
De
Bar Assoc
dra
legislation
that goes beyond the
CTS. See "Compromise
Near
Delaware," December 21, 1987,
Times at 22,
attached hereto as Exhibit D.
"Perhaps
no public policy
left in Delaware corporate
except the objective of raising
revenue." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law; Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663, 684 (1974), attached hereto as
Exhibit E.
It is increasingly evident that
current corporate abuses
are made possible by the fai
states to enact or enforce
rigorous corporation laws. The
1 justification for the
usually worthwhile experimentation stimulated by competition
among the states is, or has become,
flawed.s Competition
only works if the states must bear the costs of the benefits they
provide to entice corporations. Imagine, for example, that a
state had the authority to exempt corporations from all federal
environmental laws. Many states would enact this legislation
to encourage corporations to incorporate there, while safe in
the knowledge that most of the factories would be located elsewhere.
Economists call this an external
, and that,is the problem with
state corporation law.
Delaware can make its laws as permissive as it wants because it
bears such a tiny proportion6 of the consequences, and even that
proportion is vastly outweighed by the benefits of the tax revenue.
The "race to the bottom" continues as Delaware enacts legislation
eliminating directors' personal liabil
for much of their
fiduciary duty. State after state responds to the prospect of
takeover of a local company with self-serving and anti-takeover
legislation in a frenzy of competitive charter-mongering. One
particularly compelling drama took place in Massachusetts when
Ronald Pearlman's second attempt at "greenmailing" the Gillette
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enactment
Dukakis s

Governor

"In contrast to
California has
of
of Cal
Yet the

more
ssezbehavior
Cal
a 1s
appropriate corporate
holders' rights? has no
feet,
In addition to the dictates
affairs doctrine," a choice-ofin the forum state applying
to suits among stockholders,
officers. California
never
affairs doctrine,8 and the
recognized exception -- "
local
the law of a state other than
because that state has the
law applied.
attached
Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App.
(1982). Furthermore,
its muscle over "pseudoelsewhere but doing a
-- pursuant to the limited
The alternatives, then, to
1)

Do nothing
corporation law by
prevent Cal
governance
in the state.
voting" wou
cease
that chose to

2)

Amend
in the "race
traditions

current s

2

can exercise
those incorporated
business here
Code Section 2115.
are the following:
state
,
feet,
power over the
, even
located
as "cumulative
any corporations

statutes

to be competitive
of California's
for corporate
Morever,
tradition of
bas
on revenue
primacy in
choose Delaware
no matter what
compete. There
, with its long

tradition
shareho
and fiduciary
stewardship, to defer unduly to Delaware's statutory
3)

seek
This would involve
a determinat
cannot take action
directly to
on corporate
governance provis
desires, nonetheless,
to continue to
is field; and that
it reluctantly cone
on
way to do
this is by encouraging increas
federal corporation
law. California has a conspicuously effective delegat
in both
of
s and could have
substantial influence on any laws that are passed.
The question of whether the
lie interest is
best served having one federal or several state
corporation laws has been debated since the beginnings
of the Republic. At the constitutional convention,
Alexander Hamilton raised the question whether to
provide specially for a federal corporation power
limited however to situations where the states did
not have the apparent power to accomplish a particular
desired objective. The motion was defeated 8 to 3.
Federalizing corporate law has been the cry of the
"reformers" right up to the recent proposals of Ralph
Nader. The states have resisted all efforts in this
direction with continuing success. The only incursions
of federal f
on the state preserve are contained
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 with its
provisions relating to fraud and proxy voting practices,
amended by the Williams Act relating to takeovers.
The State Bar Associations and their congressional
allies have repeatedly beat back further federal
involvement. But the crash of 1929 led to the first
federal preemption of state corporate laws, and the
current concerns over the October 1987 drop in market
prices may provide another catacylsmic impetus for
further legislation, although the particular culprits
for Black Monday are less readily identifiable than
the causes for 1929's crash.
Under these conditions, some new federal
legislation may be possible. Through its federal
legislation, California could have an impact on the
creation of such laws and thus indirectly regulate
corporations with headquarters
California as well
as those doing business there. Realistically, however,
it must be recognized that any federal legislation
would naturally be the result of accomodating competing
national interests. The end result of federal
preemption could be a watering-down of shareholder
rights incompatible with California's public policies.lO
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known
WHEREAS, the favorable climate which the State
of Delaware has traditionally provided for
corporations has been a leading source of
revenue for the State; and
WHEREAS, many states have enacted new
corporation laws in recent years in an effort
to compete with Delaware for corporate
business; and
WHEREAS, there has been no comprehensive
revision of the De
ion Law since
its enactment in 1898; and
WHEREAS, the General Assembly of the State of
Deleware declares
to be the public policy of
the State to maintain a favorable business
climate and to encourage corporations to make
Delaware
domici
. . .
Law of December 31, 1963 v. 54, ch. 218 [1963] Del. Laws 724
(emphasis added).
3
Delaware's take from corporation franchise taxes continues
to escalate dramatical : $60.5 million in 1978, $76.5 million
in 1982 and $121
llion in 1985. U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census 1 Gov't F
es, GF79, No. 1, State Government Tax Collections, 1979 and 1978 at 16 (1979); 1982 and 1981
at 16 (1982); 1985 and 1984 at 12 (1985), attached hereto as
Exhibit C.
In 1987, Delaware's
affected 18% of the
states taxable income. See "Compromise Near In Delaware,"
December 21, 1987, New York Times at 22, Exhibit D. As a
consequence of this
se subs
, individual and corporate
taxes in Delaware are quite modest.
4
"[T]he new Delaware law to protect endangered directors is
producing sighs of rel
[in corporate boardrooms]." Herzel,
Sepro & Katz, From the Boardroom-- Next to Last Word on
Endangered Directors, January-February 1987, Harvard Bus. Rev.
at 39, attached hereto as Exhibit F.
In the last legislative
session, California fashioned a far more balanced and equitable
bill to limit directors' liability.
5
As is all too apparent to state legislators across the
nation, Delaware has controlled both the pace and direction of
statutory corporate law in the twentieth century. Delaware's
position in corporate law sterns largely from the fact that
Delaware law is considered more favorable to management than
the law of any other state. Thus, to prevent corporations from
deserting to the healthful climes of Delaware law, state
legislators have been forced to relax local laws regulating
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internal corporate affa s,
public, shareholders, and
sacrificed.

ion of the
has often been

The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 Hastings L. J.
119 (1976) (footnote omitted), attached hereto as Exhibit G.
Since corporations have been able to circumvent a state's
corporations code merely by incorporating in another state,
there has been no incentive for a state to enact a relatively
strict code. Similarly, attempts by states to regulate corporate
activities more stringently have been undermined by those states
which have enacted "enabling" type codes. Under the spectre of
their domestic businesses incorporating or reincorporating
elsewhere, with the concomitant loss of charter fees, franchise
taxes, and control over corporations which transact business
in the state, restrictive states have amended their laws to
make them more enabling.
Oldman, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations -Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 85, 104-05
(1977), attached hereto as Exhibit H.
6
Professor Cary zeroed in on the absurdity of the "present
predicament in which [Delaware] a pygmy among the 50 states
prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national
corporate policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation
within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue." Cary
Federalism and Corporate Law at 701 (emphasis added), Exhibit E.

7
California's policy is to protect the public from fraud
and deception in securities transactions. The Corporate Securities
Law of 1968 was enacted to effectuate this policy by regulating
securities transactions
California and providing statutory
remedies
violat
of
Corporations Code, in addition
to those available under common law.
Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 417, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 757 (1983) (all cases cited herein are attached hereto
as Exhibit J).
[Directors'] dealings with the corporation are subjected to
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements
with the corporation is chall
the burden is on the director
. . . not only to prove
of the transaction but
also to show its inherent
the viewpoint of the
corporation and those
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App.
2d 405, 420-21, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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8
"Since there are a
1 number
signif
differences among the corporate laws of California, New York
and Delaware regarding the manner in which corporate internal
f
are conducted,
of
internal affairs
doctrine to [a pseudo-foreign corporation] results in significant
soc
cost. That cost is the nseudo-foreign corporation's
ability to ignore the public policies of the state of its
principal place of business."
Trampling Upon the Tramp at 100-104 (emphasis added), Exhibit H.
9

Section 309 reads as follows:

The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to
determine the existence and extent of a director's or officer's
liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders,
except where, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in [Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws] Section 6 to
the parties and the transaction, in which event the local of the
other state will be applied.
10

As Professor Cary observed:

In my opinion, however [federal incorporation) is politically
unrealistic. It has been raised many times in Congress and in
the literature but has no public appeal. American business
would unanimously reject such a convenient vehicle for government
control of the major industries of this country . . . I do not
advocate or even conceive of, federal incorporation as an
imminent possibility except
the event of a catastrophic
depression or a corporate debacle.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 Yale L. J. 663, 700 (1974), Exhibit E.
11
The Supreme Court's decision in CTS materially changed the
rules in a manner that could arguably justify federal intervention
given the confusing and contradictory way that states have reacted
to the CTS decision, which could have a negative effect on interstate commerce. The SEC's Office of the Chief Economist has
evaluated the impact of an Ohio antitakeover statute on the
value of shares in 36 companies with headquarters in that state.
The Ohio law depressed stock prices by an average of two percent,
with losses ranging from $754 million to $1.45 billion. This,
by the way, refutes completely the arguments that anti-management
to the detriment of shareholders.
12
At a minimum, if Section 2115 is perceived as too sensitive
a political issue for this legislative session, the Legislature
should clearly express its intent that courts of this state
should not be limited by the dictates of Section 2115 and that
the conflicts-of-law analysis sketched on Page 8 can be used
in its place.
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VI
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION: VIEW FROM THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY
BY W. PETER SLUSSER
STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL CONTESTS
There is a distinction between the propriety of state involvement
in securities laws regulating
s, and a traditional subject
of state jurisiction, the regulation of the internal affairs
of a corporation. Without seeing the specifics of a proposed
state takeover act, it is not possible to comment on the position
the securities industry would take with regards to a particular
bill. However, the following principles would, we believe, guide
the approach of the securities industry to this subject.
CURRENT STATE REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS
Consider the rather anomalous
the current debate about
state anti-takeover statutes. Virtual
without exception, all
of the provisions of state
takeover bills could be individually
adopted by shareholders of a corporation as amendments to the
corporate charter. Since shareholders, the owners of the corporation, have an obvious
in enhanc
the value of their
investment, if the provis
such bills were as self-evidently
beneficial to the companies as
allege, shareholders
would rush to propose and adopt amendments incorporating the
substantive features of such
ls.
It seems very curious to
securities industry that the lobbyists
and the officers of major corporat
should be petitioning
the states to provide them
ion" offered by
such
lls,
appear
protection could
be obtained merely by
drafted charter
amendments to a vote at a
s. The fact is
that the supporters of
evidently not willing to
subject
proposals
vote. We are left with
the question, who then
proposals? That
the proponents wish to c
and pre-empt them
from voting on such provis
they are a good
deal less sure of
benef
s from the passage
of such bills than they are
to incumbent management.
Most of the recent
assumption
once a
interest in a corporat
,
likely mean that the abil

lls are based on the
a significant ownership
this position will
of Directors to bargain

Peter Slusser is Managing D
of Merger and Acquisitions
for Paine, Webber, in New York, New York

that person will
somewhat constra
We find it ne
sing nor objectionable that a party with a 20% interest
corporation may have a considerab
luence on the affairs
, s
e
s are
owners
corporation and as a matter
are
primary group
se benefit the
fairs of
ion are run, we
wou
object
such a party were
lly precluded from
having such an influence.
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF INAPPROPRIATE STATE REGULATION
A patchwork quilt has been created by state anti-takeover statutes.
New York was the first state to adopt a "five year freeze out"
statute. This prohibits a "resident domestic corporation" (defined
as a firm incorporated in New York with both its principal
executive offices and significant business operations in the
state, and which as at least ten percent of its stock owned
beneficially by New York residents) from engaging in a business
combination with an interested shareholder (a beneficial owner
of twenty percent or more of a firm's voting stock) for a period
of five years after the interested shareholder crosses the twenty
percent ownersh
threshold, unless the board of the resident
domestic corporation has approved either the business combination
itself or the stock purchase bringing the interested shareholder
above the twenty percent threshold.
Such a statute disenfranchises shareholders in charge of control
situations, since decisions are placed solely in the hands of
the Board of Directors. If the Board does not view the acquisition
favorably, business combinations are absolutely forbidden for
five years, no matter how shareholders may regard the matter.
A very different approach was taken by that portion of the Indiana
statute under review in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation
of America (107 s. Ct. 1637). That statute provides that if
a bidder buys shares of a corporation that is subject to the
statute, and if such a purchase would. br-ing.:t.he bidder's voting
power in the "target" above a certain threshold (20, 33 1/3 or
50%) the bidder may acquire the voting rights of the acquired
shares only with the approval of a majority of the corporation's
" sinterested shares," i.e., those not owned by the bidder
or management. This is typically called a "control share" statute.
Although a majority of the Supreme Court found that the statute
was constitutional since they viewed it as an investor protection
measure consistent with the Williams Act, another portion of the
statute (which was not under review in the case before the Court)
adopted the New York five year freeze out provision as well,
indicating that shareholder protection was not the sole or even
the primary concern of the statute.
Other states which have adopted control share statutes have
differed considerably from Indiana's approach. For example,
Ohio's Control Share Acquisitions Act applies to Ohio corporations
having their principal places of business, principal executive
offices or substantial assets within Ohio. The law, however,
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does not
re
shareholders. North
Carolina's recently adopted
statute dispenses
with Indiana's domes c
rement and applies
to corporations incorporated in other states but having more than
forty percent of their fixed U.S. assets, more than forty percent
of their U.S. employees, and more than ten percent of their
shareholders resident in
Carolina. Still another state
that has adopted an anti-takeover statute, Pennsylvania, applies
it only to Pennsylvania corporations, but does not require
additional contacts, such as a principal place of business or the
presence of shareholders within the state.
It is often argued by proponents of state anti-takeover statutes
that such laws are a traditional area for state legislation.
In fact nothing is farther from the truth.
In 1965 when Congress
began work on various legislative proposals which ultimately
resulted in passage of the Williams Act, not a single state had
any sort of a takeover statute, although at that point states
had been regulating corporations for more than 170 years. It
is true that the Williams Act does not deal with state antitakeover laws, but that is because at the time state laws on the
subject did not exist. Just shortly before the enactment of the
Williams Act, Virginia became the first state to adopt such a
statute. Almost all state takeover statutes currently on the
books are less than five years old, and most of them were enacted
after a local corporation had sensed that it might become a target.
Notwithstanding our arguments above, if a state insists upon
passing a takeover statute, before the securities industry court can
support such a bill it must have certain characteristics. The
securities industry would insist on a fair and even handed approach
to takeover legislation, which is consistent with federal law.
The Williams Act carefully adopts a policy of neutrality as
between bidder and
,
ted provisions designed to
provide full disclosure to shareholders.
Congress was interested in maintaining a balance of power between
corporate managers and corporate acquirors, and ensuring that
shareholders had sufficient
ion to make their own judgment
concerning the merits of a proposal. Such an approach is essential
to any state legislative proposal that would govern takeovers.
Consequently, it is most unlikely that "freeze out" state statutes
would ever receive the support of the securities industry. Nor
are ''control share" bills 1
to be supported, because as a
practical matter they always seem to contain provisions which
lt the balance in favor
incumbent management.
For example, the portion of the Indiana statute upheld in CTS
permitted only "disinterested" shares to vote on the question
of whether a so-called control block of stock should be given
voting rights. While on
sur
is
seem evenhanded,
upon analysis the "tilt" of
provision becomes obvious. For
instance, would anyone
ly contend that in a contested
election between a Democratic candidate and a Republican candidate
that only citizens registered as
should be permitted

to cast a ballot, since Democrats and Republicans would be biased
in favor of their own candidate? Just as an effort to disenfranchise fellow citizens with a party affiliation from voting
such an election would be absurd, it is likewise absurd to
senfranchise fellow shareholders from voting in a change of
corporate control situation because they may be predisposed to
vote for one side or the other. Just as any citizen has an
interest in good government and the selection of the best possible
candidate for·political office, so too every shareholder has
an interest in an efficiently run corporation and the selection
of the best possible management.
The practical effect of such provisions is to favor incumbent
management, particularly since the management of many "target"
corporations often have a small ownership interest in their
own firms. No state permits only "disinterested" shareholders
to vote on such matters as the election of directors or merger
agreements, but if such an approach were as beneficial as claimed,
there would be every reason for states to enact such provisions.
Shareholders protection is the focus of the securities industry.
We object to placing solely in the hands of one side the power
to decide if an offer may be made to shareholders. A bill
requiring shareholder approval of certain actions taken in
response to a takeover bid moves closer to a position that the
securities industry could support. This is best addressed,
however, through those provisions of state corporate law that
deal with shareholder voting.
IF LEGISLATION IS TO BE ADOPTED MODIFYING THE REGULATION OF
TAKEOVERS, IT SHOULD BE FEDERAL LEGISLATION
By virtue of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and the
practical need of regulation to reflect the interstate nature
of the business, there is no role for the. states in the regulation
of takeovers.
If there is one proposition about the current federal regulatory
scheme for tender offers which is manifest in the legislative
history of the Williams Act, and the Williams Act itself, it is
that the Act is neutral as between a tender offeror and a target
corporation. The provisions of the Williams Act focus on
assisting shareholder, not the management of either the target
or the offeror. The sponsor of the Act, Senator Harrison Williams,
made th
point explicitly:
"We have·taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bids. S. 510 (the Senate Bill
which became the Williams Act) is designed solely to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."
(113 Cong. Rec. 24664
(1967) Remarks of Senator Williams.)
The Edgar v. Mite and CTS decisions have not really altered
that view in so far as the Supreme Court has continued to hold
that the states cannot adopt laws that frustrate the purpose
of Congress in adopting a national scheme of regulation. Without
a national standard, protection of local, parochial interests
occurs, often to the detriment of shareholder rights.
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The answer is for the f
l
to reassert its role.
There are two reasons for this:
(1) state anti-takeover laws
will make it impossible to achieve the goals of the Williams
Act and (2) such laws Balkanize the economy and create the
equivalent of domestic trade protection laws.
States are justifiably concerned about employment and business
within their own borders. But they are free to create an
attractive business climate through a myriad of perfectly
legitimate means, such as tax incentives, development and job
training assistance, the creation of specialized research centers
at state universities and so on. What a state should not be
permitted to do is to declare a blockade against commerce among
the states.
The securities industry supports Congressional action that would
clearly preempt the states from regulating corporate ,control
contests. Such a preemption would imply a more active role for
the SEC in establishing the appropriate level of investor protection and neutrality between bidders and targets, so as to
allay the legitimate concerns of state legislators for the welfare
of companies doing business in their states and shareholders
investing in those companies. Amendments to the federal laws
may be necessary to insure a "level playing field" between parties
to a contested offer, full disclosure of all material facts
pertaining to offers and management responses to offers, and
sufficient time being granted to investors to properly study
offers and for management to review, analyze and respond to
offers.
Explicitly preempting the states from regulating corporate
takeovers does not violate the concept of "states rights," but
instead asserts the national interest in a nationwide free market
with appropriate shareholder safeguards. The choice is clearly
presented to Congress; it must either preempt the states, or
it must be prepared to see
Williams Act rendered a nullity
by state legislatures cajoled into enacting takeover restrictions
tailor-made to accommodate the interests of incurnbant management.

CHAPTER VII
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION: A VIEW FROM PENSION FUNDS AND INVESTOR GROUPS
BY JANICE HESTER
Introduction
Both public and private pension funds now occupy a unique
position in the u.s. economy.
Institutional investors, such
as pension funds and endowment funds now account for the great
majority of securities ownership in this country. These funds
represent a significant resource for raising the necessary
capital corporations require to fund and operate business
enterprises.
This provides jobs and other benefits to the general community,
such as payrolls which can be taxed to provide goods and services
to the public. The funds, though enormous in size, actually
represent the interests of millions of small investors. For all
practical purposes, the funds must be thought of as perpetual.
For instance, the funding period for public pension funds is
presently 30 to 50 years.
In addition to the long-term nature
of the funds, recent emographic changes in the general population
have resulted in many pension funds having significant unfunded
obligations: The general population is aging, therefore the number
of persons receiving benefits from the funds is increasing while
the number of active or working members is declining, with the
result that many funds have a deficiency in funding.
These unfunded obligations often number in the tens of billions
of dollars and cannot be offset by contribution increases from
members and employers. The investment retu~n and investment
allocation posture of
-funds becomes·important under these
circumstances.
Anti-Takeover Legislation and Stock Ownership
Due to the long-term investment
izon of public pension funds
and the concerns over providing benefits to an ever aging population,
stock ownership has become an important component of the investment
management plans of such funds across the country.
For example, the California State Teachers' Retirement System
had a 25% limitation on stock ownership until legislation was
passed to allow the use of the prudent man rule regarding investments
in 1984. Actuarial studies, encompassing historical rates of
return for various investment vehicles, wage inflation, projected
benefit obligations, and general inflation suggested that the
only way to alleviate the unfunded obligat
and have sufficient
assets to pay future benefits was to increase the percentage of

Janice Hester is Corporate Affa s Advisor for the California
State Teachers Retirement
stem.
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equity investments. A wel known study
general market
by Ibbottson and Sinquefield concluded that over a long period
of time, the last fifty years, common stocks provided a superior
rate of return to both corporate and government bonds. The size
of public pension funds argues against high turnover
idual
SECUrities.
Each time a security is sold or purchased, a commission must be
paid.
In addition, the positions that the funds hold in individual
stocks are quite large and influence the pr
s of the securit s
which are targeted for investment or sale. This has led to an
even greater percentage of both the equity and fixed income
segments being indexed. For example, 79% of the equity segment
of the California State Teachers' Retirement System's portfolio
is indexed or passively managed. This means that the only way
changes are made within those accounts is through takeovers,
n:ergers, tender offers or involuntary liquidations, and bankruptcies. The turnover in passively managed accounts is less
than five percent annually.· This consideration argues for
pension fund trustees being in favor of offers to buy their stock,
whether such offers are sanctioned by management or hostile towards
management or not.
The enactment and adoption of management sponsored state antitakeover legislation and defensive anti-takeover corporate charter
measures are unnecessary and unfair interpositions by management
and its supporters between buyer and seller, in what is co~~only
thought to be a free market economy. Furthermore, a fundamental
rightof anyinvestor is the right to sell or retain an investment.
It is investors who bear the risk of management's competence
in running these corporations; and they bear this risk with their
own capital. Although consideration of employees, suppliers,
customers, community interest is certainly proper, the investor's
interest should receive preference. In order to run a profitable
and successful business, management should consider the above
aspects. This is what investors, especially shareholders pay
management to do. Presumably if management is doing its job
well, and withprofits, dividends, and/or market appreciation
responding accordingly, shareholders will be satisfied and not
deslrous of selling their stock. If on the other hand, as is
so often the case, assets are undervalued and it appears that
incurnbent management is a new management to shepherd their
strnents. Although management argues for defensive protections
on the grounds that community interests will be harmed if they
are not allowed, the evidence for this claim is not persuasive.
Management causes plant closings, bankruptcies, moves operations
to other states, causing dislocation of workers and hardships
on particular dependent communities as well as bidders. Such
decisions are made due to business and market concerns; the
identity of the person responsible for implementing such decisions
has no bearing. In addition, such legislation further isolates
management from both its investors and employees.
It is no _
longer accountable.
If management is shielded from competition,
who will be able to protest when market share is being lost due
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to sharp foreign
, or
environmental concerns
such as asbestos or pollution are hurting a particular company?
In the long-run, granting this protection may cause all the
hardships it is designed to prevent. It is neither to the benefit
of shareholders, nor labor, governmental bodies or social and
community interests to leave the power of management to run
unchecked.
Finally, it should be recognized that anti-takeover legislation,
and def2nsive charter amendments do nothing to protect the jobs
or employees or the interest of the community, suppliers or
customers. This legislation protects the jobs of management.
If more favorable legislation is passed in another state, management
will reincorporate yet again. Management is not arguing for
plant closing legislation or layoff prevention for lower level
employees, including upper and middle management. This legislation
is circled around the top ten or twelve persons in corporations
which often have thousands of employees.
Summary
It is clear that the U.S. society and economv are changing in
important ways. The average age of the population is increasing.
This will mean that pension funds and retirement programs will
face even greater demands for benefits in the future. For the
majority of Americans, pension funds are now the investment
vehicle; individual ownership of securities is on the decline.
The size of these funds seems overwhelminq, but is should be
remembered that they represent the interests of millions of small
investors.
If these funds are not able to earn an adequate investment return
to cover benefit demands, taxpayers will have to provide for
the deficiency.
In the most recent bull market, takeovers were
an important part of the wealth which was realized in the stock
market.
s wealth effect
to the rest of the population,
whether shareholders spend it on goods or reinvest it in another
corporation. Thus, takeovers are beneficial to the general
economy as well as to shareholders. It should be remembered
that management isn't asking for legislation to eliminate takeovers,
only to give it more of a bargaining chit in the process. Both
labor and shareholders should oppose any further attempts by
management to isolate itself, and avoid being held accountable
for its actions.
The long-term investment requirements of pension funds makes
stock ownership a necessity, and in ever increasing precentages
relative to total portfolio value. This argues for maximizing
the investment return and an important component is the ability
to take advantage of takeovers, mergers and tender offers.
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